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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Jackie Nichols is a resident, property owner, and 
taxpayer in the City of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. Rehoboth 
Beach held a special election—open to residents of more than 
six months—for approval of a $52.5 million bond issue, and 
the resolution passed. Nichols voted in the election. She then 
filed this civil action challenging the election and the resultant 
issuance of bonds. The District Court found that Nichols 
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lacked standing and dismissed the case. The sole issue on 
appeal is whether Nichols had, as she claims, municipal 
taxpayer standing to make such a challenge. Because Nichols 
has failed to show an illegal use of municipal taxpayer 
funds—and therefore cannot establish standing on municipal 
taxpayer grounds—we will affirm the District Court’s Order. 
I. 
A. 
The facts of this case are simple. On April 27, 2015, 
the Board of Commissioners of Rehoboth Beach adopted a 
resolution proposing the issuance of up to $52.5 million in 
general obligation bonds to finance an ocean outfall project. 
The resolution followed an initial resolution and a public 
hearing, as required by Section 40(d)-(e) of Rehoboth 
Beach’s City Charter. Pursuant to the City Charter, Rehoboth 
Beach held a special election on June 27, 2015, to determine 
whether it was authorized to borrow funds to finance the 
project. Rehoboth Beach expended municipal funds on the 
special election: first, before the election, it used taxpayer 
funds to place a full-page advertisement in a local newspaper 
urging the voters to “Vote Yes” in favor of the proposed 
outfall project; second, the costs of the special election were 
paid from the Rehoboth Beach treasury.  
The Rehoboth Beach City Charter governs the voting 
procedures for special elections. Section 40(h) of the Charter 
states the following: 
At the said Special Election, every owner or 
leaseholder, as defined in this Charter, of 
property, whether an individual, partnership or 
corporation, shall have one vote and every 
person who is a bona fide resident of the City of 
Rehoboth Beach, but who is not an owner or 
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leaseholder, as defined in this Charter, of 
property within the corporate limits of the City 
of Rehoboth Beach and who would be entitled 
at the time of holding of the said Special 
Election to register and vote in the Annual 
Municipal Election if such Annual Municipal 
Election were held on the day of the Special 
Election shall have one vote whether or not 
such person be registered to vote in the Annual 
Municipal Election. 
Charter of Rehoboth Beach § 40(h) (1963), 
http://charters.delaware.gov/rehobothbeach.pdf. Section 40 
does not define the term “bona fide resident,” but Section 7 of 
the Charter, which deals with the manner of holding annual 
elections, defines the term “resident” as “an individual 
actually residing and domiciled in the City of Rehoboth 
Beach for a period of six months immediately preceding the 
date of the election.” Id. § 7(d). 
  At the special election, Rehoboth Beach accepted only 
voters who were either property owners or who had been 
residents for a minimum of six months. Corporations and 
other artificial entities that owned property in Rehoboth 
Beach were also permitted to vote. Nichols alleges that 
persons who owned several parcels of property in Rehoboth 
Beach through the ownership of artificial entities were 
granted one vote for each parcel owned. She further alleges 
that those who qualified as residents and who owned property 
were granted two votes. The votes of the special election were 
tallied, and the majority of eligible voters approved the 
issuance of the general obligation bonds—637 votes to 606 
votes.  Nichols is a property owner in Rehoboth Beach and 
voted in the special election. 
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B. 
 Nichols filed this action 19 days after the special 
election vote took place. About a month later, she filed a four-
count amended complaint against the City of Rehoboth 
Beach, Sam Cooper (mayor of Rehoboth Beach), and Sharon 
Lynn (city manager of Rehoboth Beach). In Counts I and II of 
the amended complaint, Nichols alleged that Rehoboth Beach 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring voters to 
live in, or hold property in, Rehoboth Beach for six months 
before being entitled to vote as residents. In Count III, she 
alleged that Rehoboth Beach violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment by allowing property owners to vote more than 
once. Count IV was a pendent state law claim for “exceeding 
authority” in which Nichols alleged that Rehoboth Beach had 
violated Delaware law by purchasing the newspaper 
advertisement encouraging voters to support the issuance of 
bonds.  
 Rehoboth Beach filed a motion to dismiss Nichols’s 
amended complaint, arguing, among other things, that 
Nichols lacked standing because, as a resident and property 
owner, she had voted in the election and had thus suffered no 
injury. The District Court issued a memorandum opinion and 
order granting Rehoboth Beach’s motion and dismissing the 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court 
explained: 
The court agrees with Defendants that Nichols 
lacks standing. Initially, the court agrees with 
Defendants that Nichols is not contesting the 
expenditure of tax funds, but the legality of the 
Special Election. Second, the court notes that 
Nichols suffered no particularized injury as a 
result of the Special Election. Nichols is a 
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property owner in the city and had the right to 
vote in the Special Referenda Election. Thus, 
she lacks the concrete personal injury necessary 
to bring suit. As a result, the court lacks the 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action. 
 
(App. 19–20.) Having concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, the District Court did not address any of 
Rehoboth Beach’s remaining arguments. Nichols timely 
appealed. 
II. 
 “We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
over a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 
our review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.” 
Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 180 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
III. 
 Nichols argues that the District Court misperceived her 
allegations and that she has standing—not as a voter but as a 
municipal taxpayer. She presents two bases upon which we 
could find that she has municipal taxpayer standing to bring 
her case. First, she argues that she has standing to challenge 
the $52.5 million in municipal debt incurred by an allegedly 
unlawful special election. Second, she contends that she has 
standing to challenge Rehoboth Beach’s use of municipal 
funds to hold the special election and to purchase a 
newspaper advertisement in support of that election. 
Nichols’s first argument fails because she has not challenged 
the expenditure of the $52.5 million, merely the special 
election that approved the issuance of the bonds. Her second 
argument fails because she has not alleged a direct link 
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between the expenditure of municipal funds and the 
challenged aspect of the municipal action and because those 
expenditures were de minimis.  
A.  Municipal Taxpayer Standing 
 “Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial 
power of the United States to the resolution of Cases and 
Controversies, and Article III standing enforces the 
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597–98 
(2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
“One of the controlling elements in the definition of a case or 
controversy under Article III is standing.” Id. at 598 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The elements 
necessary for establishing “the irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing” under Article III are as follows: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury 
in fact—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent 
action of some third party not before the court. 
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision. 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 
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 The Supreme Court has roundly rejected federal 
taxpayer standing noting that a federal taxpayer’s interest “in 
seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the 
Constitution does not give rise to the kind of redressable 
‘personal injury’ required for Article III standing.” Hein, 551 
U.S. at 599 (explaining that an “interest in ensuring that 
[federal] funds are not used by the Government in a way that 
violates the Constitution” is “too generalized and attenuated 
to support Article III standing”). This follows from the fact 
that a federal taxpayer’s 
interest in the moneys of the treasury . . . is 
shared with millions of others, is comparatively 
minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon 
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, 
so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no 
basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive 
powers of a court of equity. 
Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923); see also Doremus v. Bd. of 
Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952) (reiterating that 
“the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal 
treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and 
indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive 
powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure”).  
 Likewise, “state taxpayers have no standing under 
Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply 
by virtue of their status as taxpayers.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. 
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). Federal and state 
taxpayers cannot show Article III standing based on their 
status as taxpayers “because the alleged injury is not concrete 
and particularized, but instead a grievance the taxpayer 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people 
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generally.” Id. at 344 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). “In addition, the injury is not actual or imminent, 
but instead conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 The Supreme Court has, however, allowed one form of 
taxpayer standing to survive: standing based on municipal 
taxpayer status. This difference in the treatment of municipal 
taxpayers is justified, at least in theory, by the closeness 
between the municipal taxpayer and the expenditure of 
municipal taxpayer funds. As explained in Frothingham:  
The interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in 
the application of its moneys is direct and 
immediate and the remedy by injunction to 
prevent their misuse is not inappropriate. It is 
upheld by a large number of state cases and is 
the rule of this court. . . . The reasons which 
support the extension of the equitable remedy to 
a single taxpayer in such cases are based upon 
the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to 
the corporation, which is not without some 
resemblance to that subsisting between 
stockholder and private corporation. 
262 U.S. at 486–87.  Thus, unlike a state or federal taxpayer, a 
municipal taxpayer may challenge certain expenditures of 
municipal funds in federal court.  
 Though a municipal taxpayer may, in some cases, 
challenge municipal expenditures, her right to do so is not 
unlimited. We have applied the “good-faith pocketbook” 
requirements, articulated by the Supreme Court in Doremus, 
to municipal taxpayer standing. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434 
(explaining that “a good-faith pocketbook action” is one in 
which a plaintiff alleges “a direct dollars-and-cents injury”). 
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The municipal taxpayer plaintiffs in Doremus challenged a 
state law mandating Bible reading in public schools. 342 U.S. 
at 430–31. The Supreme Court concluded that they lacked 
standing as municipal taxpayers because they failed to show 
that the Bible reading resulted in any direct monetary cost. Id. 
at 431 (“[I]t is neither conceded nor proved that the brief 
interruption in the day’s schooling caused by compliance with 
the statute adds cost to the school expenses or varies by more 
than an incomputable scintilla the economy of the day’s 
work.”). The plaintiffs made no allegation that the Bible 
reading was “supported by any separate tax or paid for from 
any particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever 
to the cost of the school.”  Id. at 433. Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs failed to show that the Bible reading had any impact 
on their overall tax burden.  Id. (“No information is given as 
to what kind of taxes are paid by appellants and there is no 
averment that the Bible reading increases any tax they do pay 
or that as taxpayers they are, will, or possibly can be out of 
pocket because of it.”). Thus, the Supreme Court made clear 
in Doremus that in order for a municipal taxpayer to have 
standing in federal court, she must demonstrate (1) that a 
particular expenditure accompanied the allegedly illegal 
practice and (2) that it put her “out of pocket.” 
 Accordingly, in ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall, we 
recognized that, following Doremus, plaintiffs must 
“establish more than a potential de minimis drain on tax 
revenues due to the [allegedly unconstitutional conduct].” 246 
F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2001). In ACLU-NJ, residents of Wall 
Township, New Jersey, filed a suit against the Township, 
alleging that the Township’s holiday display violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 260. The 
holiday display consisted of a variety of holiday items, 
including a crèche and a menorah. We observed that, even 
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though the Township “own[ed] the Nativity display, and 
presumably the menorah, and the overall display [was] set up 
with defendant’s support, direction and/or approval,” the 
Township did not “maintain” the display. Id. at 263. As such, 
we held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they 
“failed to establish an expenditure on the challenged elements 
of the [holiday] display.” Id. at 263–64. The Township did 
not expend funds by displaying the religious elements it 
owned. A plaintiff must therefore establish a municipal 
expenditure on the challenged aspect of the disputed practice 
in order to have municipal taxpayer standing.  
 We further clarified that, even if the Township had 
used its own paid employees to erect the display, or had used 
Township funds to light it, we would not, without further 
evidence, assume that such expenditures amounted to 
anything more than de minimis expenditures. And, consistent 
with Doremus, de minimis expenditures attributable to the 
challenged practice are insufficient to confer Article III 
standing. Therefore, a municipal taxpayer plaintiff must show 
(1) that he pays taxes to the municipal entity, and (2) that 
more than a de minimis amount of tax revenue has been 
expended on the challenged practice itself. ACLU-NJ, 246 
F.3d at 263–64; see also Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 
173 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 1999).  
B.  The Issuance of Bonds 
 As an initial observation, we agree with the District 
Court that “Nichols is not contesting the expenditure of tax 
funds, but the legality of the Special Election.” (App. 19–20.) 
We are not faced with the question of whether Nichols would 
have had standing to challenge these voting requirements 
under different circumstances—e.g., in a case where she was 
not permitted to vote. Certainly, as the District Court 
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recognized, Nichols was both a property owner in and a 
resident of Rehoboth Beach and therefore has no basis to 
challenge the voting requirements directly. Instead, Nichols 
has attempted to remedy her lack of traditional “injury-in-
fact” by asserting municipal taxpayer standing. This she 
cannot do.1    
 In order for a plaintiff to gain access to federal court 
using municipal taxpayer standing, she must show that the 
municipality has actually expended funds on the allegedly 
illegal elements of the disputed practice. Nichols’s argument 
on appeal fails to grasp this inherent requirement, despite her 
recognition that “[m]unicipal taxpayer standing is available 
when there is an expenditure of municipal tax funds on an 
                                              
1 Nichols waives any argument that she has standing as 
a voter, see Appellant’s Br. 15 (“The particular injury was to 
Ms. Nichols as a municipal taxpayer, not as a voter . . . .”), 
but mentions parenthetically that “the dilution of her vote as a 
result of those unlawful rules should provide an independent 
ground for her standing,” id. This position is developed only 
in a footnote with a brief citation to authority. Any argument 
that she has standing as a voter is accordingly waived. See 
John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 
1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such 
as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered 
waived.”). The Dissent “question[s] whether anyone else 
would be a more suitable plaintiff to litigate . . . the ‘one 
person, one vote’ claim.” Dissent, lines 284–85. We do not 
pass judgment on whether Nichols would be an appropriate 
plaintiff to make such a challenge since she waived her ability 
to challenge the voting requirements directly.  
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unconstitutional practice.” Appellant’s Br. 8.2 Because the 
$52.5 million was not spent on an illegal practice, Nichols 
cannot assert municipal taxpayer standing to challenge the 
expenditure. 
 The Dissent mischaracterizes the nature of the injury 
Nichols alleged and asserts that the proposed issuance of 
$52.5 million in general obligation bonds satisfies the injury 
requirement. Dissent, Lines 91–93. Certainly, if $52.5 million 
had been expended on an illegal practice, this would be a 
different case. But Nichols did not allege that there was 
anything illegal about what the $52.5 million was to be 
expended on. The only expenditure that Nichols can 
challenge is the cost of holding the special election—not the 
resultant issuance of bonds—and, as we will explain below, 
those funds would have been expended regardless of whether 
the voting requirements were unconstitutional or not. 
                                              
2 The cases that Nichols cites illustrate that municipal 
taxpayer standing exists only in cases where plaintiffs seek to 
challenge unlawful expenditures. See, e.g., Smith v. Jefferson 
Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 210 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“[M]unicipal taxpayers may fulfill the injury requirement by 
pleading an alleged misuse of municipal funds.”); Bd. of Ed. 
v. N.Y. Teachers Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(“[A] municipal taxpayer has standing to challenge allegedly 
unlawful municipal expenditures.”); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 
F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[M]unicipal taxpayer standing 
simply requires the ‘injury’ of an allegedly improper 
expenditure of municipal funds. . . .”); see also Freedom 
From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1470 
(7th Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff’s status as a municipal taxpayer 
is irrelevant for standing purposes if no tax money is spent on 
the allegedly unconstitutional activity.”). 
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C.  Municipal Expenditures 
 Nichols also contends that she has municipal taxpayer 
standing to bring this action on the basis of two expenditures 
by Rehoboth Beach: (1) the funds required to hold the special 
election and (2) the funds used to purchase an advertisement 
in a local newspaper. Neither of these expenditures is 
sufficient to grant Nichols standing. As such, she does not 
have municipal taxpayer standing to challenge the special 
election, and the District Court properly dismissed her 
complaint. 
1. 
We conclude that the expenditure of municipal funds 
to hold a special election is not sufficient to establish 
municipal taxpayer standing. Nichols alleged that the voting 
procedures at the special election—the six-month residency 
requirement and the ability of property owners to vote more 
than once—violated the Fourteenth Amendment. She did not 
assert that Rehoboth Beach expended funds on the allegedly 
unconstitutional aspects of the special election, i.e., the voting 
requirements. The special election itself would have been 
held regardless of the procedures Rehoboth Beach employed. 
In other words, Rehoboth Beach would have expended the 
funds necessary to hold the special election even if the voting 
requirements had been different.  
As noted above, in ACLU-NJ, the plaintiffs could not 
show that the Township expended funds on the challenged 
element—the public display of religious symbols. Because 
the plaintiffs failed to establish an expenditure on the 
challenged elements of the holiday display, they could not 
show municipal taxpayer standing. ACLU-NJ, 246 F.3d at 
263–64.  Here, Nichols’s concern is not that Rehoboth Beach 
held a special election to approve bonds but rather that some 
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of the requirements of the special election were 
unconstitutional. But the complaint fails to allege any direct 
link between the expenditure of municipal funds and the 
allegedly unconstitutional elements of the special election—
and this failure is fatal to Nichols’s claim.3 
2. 
Rehoboth Beach’s purchase of an advertisement in a 
local newspaper similarly does not support municipal 
taxpayer standing in this instance. There is no dispute that 
Rehoboth Beach expended municipal funds when it 
purchased an advertisement alerting the public to the special 
election. Again, the purported illegality of the election 
procedures has nothing to do with the expenditure of funds 
for the advertisement—an appropriate expenditure. The 
                                              
3 Even if there were a direct connection between the 
funds expended on the special election and the challenged 
voting practice, we would reach the same result. That de 
minimis costs were associated with the special election itself 
does not give rise to Article III standing. ACLU-NJ, 246 F.3d 
at 264 (requiring more than de minimis municipal 
expenditures to make a “good-faith pocketbook action”). The 
Dissent asserts that “the issuance of $52.5 million in 
municipal bonds cannot really be compared to the trivial 
amount of taxpayer money a municipality could have 
possibly spent to erect and light two discrete components of a 
seasonal holiday display.” Dissent, Lines 116–19. Obviously 
not. But that comparison misses the mark since the $52.5 
million at issue in this case was not expended on a challenged 
practice. By contrast, the challenged expenditure in ACLU-NJ 
was the cost of erecting and lighting the religious elements in 
the holiday display, which is comparable to the expense of 
holding the election here.  
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advertisement simply urged eligible voters to participate. 
Moreover, the cost is analogous to the types of expenses 
dismissed in ACLU-NJ as de minimis—such as the cost of 
electricity required to light the religious elements of a display. 
Accordingly, the advertisement does not qualify as the kind 
of “direct dollars-and-cents injury” required under Doremus 
for “a good-faith pocketbook action.” Doremus, 342 U.S. at 
434; see also Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(“[I]n order for the taxpayer to have standing, he must show 
that his position as a taxpayer is in some way affected . . . .”). 
This expenditure cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for 
municipal taxpayer standing.    
IV.  
Because Nichols does not have standing as a municipal 
taxpayer, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of her 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
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Nichols v. City of Rehoboth Beach, et al., No. 15-3979, 
dissenting. 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
I must respectfully dissent.  The City of Rehoboth 
Beach held a special election to authorize a $52.5 million 
bond issuance, which was approved—637 votes to 606 votes.  
In Counts I and II of her amended complaint, Jackie Nichols 
alleged that Rehoboth Beach, Mayor Sam Cooper, and City 
Manager Sharon Lynn violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
by requiring individuals to reside in the municipality for at 
least six months in order to cast votes as Rehoboth Beach 
residents.  In Count III, she claimed that Defendants violated 
“the ‘one person, one vote’ principle of the 14th Amendment” 
by allowing “individuals one vote for each parcel of property 
they owned in Rehoboth (directly or indirectly through an 
entity), in addition to one vote if they also resided in 
Rehoboth.”  (A12.)  “Count IV was a pendent state law claim 
for ‘exceeding authority’ in which Nichols alleged that 
Rehoboth Beach had violated Delaware law by purchasing 
the newspaper advertisement encouraging voters to support 
the issuance of bonds.”  (Maj. Op. at 5.)  Unlike the majority, 
I conclude that Nichols—as a municipal taxpayer—has 
Article III standing to bring her federal constitutional claims 
as well as her state law cause of action.  In addition, I believe 
that, while she fails to satisfy the requirements for prudential 
standing with respect to Counts I and II, she has prudential 
standing to litigate Counts III and IV. 
 
 The majority appropriately points out that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has, however, allowed one form of taxpayer 
standing to survive:  standing based on municipal taxpayer 
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status.”  (Id. at 9.)  Under the doctrine of municipal taxpayer 
standing, “[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the 
application of its money is direct and immediate and the 
remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not 
inappropriate.”  Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 
(1923).  “In other words, under Frothingham we presume a 
municipal taxpayer’s relationship to the municipality is 
‘direct and immediate’ such that the taxpayer suffers concrete 
injury whenever the ‘challenged activity involves a 
measurable appropriation or loss of revenue.’”  United States 
v. City of N.Y., 972 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 
D.C. Common Cause v. Dist. of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 5 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).  In fact, a number of judges have 
questioned whether this well-established approach—which 
dates back to the 1800s—is at odds with both modern 
standing principles as well as the contemporary realities of 
municipal financing and spending practices.  See, e.g., Smith 
v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 221 
(6th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring) (addressing 
“tension between the municipal-taxpayer-standing doctrine 
and modern standing principles”); City of N.Y., 972 F.2d at 
471 (questioning Frothingham presumption given existence 
of municipalities with multi-billion dollar budgets).  
According to the Sixth Circuit, “municipal taxpayers are able 
to rely on what would otherwise be labeled a generalized 
grievance,” and they are thereby allowed “to sidestep the 
‘zone of interest’ test that courts apply in other instances.”  
Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 
591 n.4 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Smith, 641 F.3d at 222 
(Sutton, J., concurring)), cert. denied sub nom. Kucera v. 
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 136 S. Ct. 1246 (2016).  
Yet “[t]he Supreme Court created the distinction and has 
stood by it for some time, requiring lower courts like ours to 
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apply it as is.”  Smith, 641 F.3d at 222 (Sutton, J., concurring) 
(citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1984)). 
 
I find that the District Court did not approach this 
generous notion of municipal taxpayer standing with the 
seriousness and care it deserves.  “If standing is ‘one of the 
most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of the public 
law,’ Flast v. Cohen, [392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)], nowhere is 
this better demonstrated than in the area of municipal 
taxpayer standing.”  Warnock v. NFL, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, 
540 (W.D. Pa.), aff’d, 154 F. App’x 291 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Nevertheless, the District Court merely cited general legal 
principles governing the standing inquiry and, without a 
detailed explanation, stated that it “agrees with Defendants 
that Nichols is not contesting the expenditure of tax funds, but 
the legality of the Special Election.”  Nichols v. City of 
Rehoboth Beach, C.A. No. 15-602 GMS, 2015 WL 8751180, 
at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2015).  Unlike the majority, the 
District Court did not discuss any municipal taxpayer cases or 
address the governing principles of this doctrine.  The 
majority, in any event, recognizes that we exercise de novo 
review over the District Court’s dismissal on standing 
grounds.  See, e.g., Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 
725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2291 (2014).  “In examining a challenge to a party’s standing, 
the Court must accept as true all material allegations set forth 
in the complaint and construe those facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party.”  Nichols, 2015 WL 8751180, at *2 (citing 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Storino v. 
Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  General factual allegations of injury resulting from 
the defendant’s actions may be sufficient at the motion to 
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dismiss stage.  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
 
To satisfy the standing requirements of Article III, a 
plaintiff must show that:  (1) he or she has suffered an injury 
in fact “that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action; and (3) it 
is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560-61).  In order to meet the injury requirement, a 
municipal taxpayer must establish a so-called “good-faith 
pocketbook” injury.  See, e.g., ACLU-NJ v. Twp. of Wall, 
246 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] municipal taxpayer 
may possess standing to litigate ‘a good faith pocketbook 
action.’” (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 
(1952))); see also, e.g., Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 327 (3d 
Cir. 1965) (stating that, in order to have standing, plaintiff 
must show position as taxpayer is in some way affected and, 
in short, that action constitutes good-faith pocketbook action).  
A municipal taxpayer establishes a good-faith pocketbook 
injury by showing “a measurable appropriation or 
disbursement” of public funds “occasioned solely by the 
activities complained of.”  Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 
429, 434 (1952) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947)); see also, e.g., D.C. Common Cause v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“One commentator 
has interpreted Doremus as requiring a taxpayer to challenge 
an activity involving an expenditure of public funds that 
would not otherwise be made.” (citing Note, Taxpayers’ 
Suits:  A Survey and Summary, 69 Yale L.J. 895, 922 
(1960))). 
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According to Nichols, she has an interest as a 
municipal taxpayer in challenging “the unlawful incurring of 
municipal debt by issuing bonds to be repaid from tax funds.”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 11 (footnote omitted).)  She also points 
to the Defendants’ use of taxpayer funds to purchase a 
newspaper advertisement and to conduct the special election.  
I believe that the proposed issuance of $52.5 million in 
general obligation bonds—based on an election conducted 
pursuant to allegedly unconstitutional voting rules and 
decided by a mere thirty-one votes—satisfies the injury 
requirement.  Likewise, this bond issuance meets the 
causation and redressability prongs.  Because Nichols thereby 
has Article III standing to pursue her federal constitutional 
claims, I need not—and do not—consider whether the 
election expenditures likewise meet these standing 
requirements.  In addition, I conclude that the use of taxpayer 
money to purchase an advertisement in a local newspaper 
satisfies the requirements for Article III standing with respect 
to Nichols’s state law cause of action. 
 
The proposed bond issuance constitutes a “good-faith 
pocketbook” injury.  In ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall, 246 
F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001), two taxpayers challenged on 
Establishment Clause grounds the inclusion of a crèche and a 
menorah in a holiday display erected near the entrance to the 
township’s municipal building, id. at 260.  We determined 
that the plaintiffs failed to carry “their burden of proving an 
expenditure of revenues to which they contribute that would 
make their suit ‘a good-faith pocketbook action.’”  Id. at 264 
(quoting Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434).  The Court explained 
that, even if we were to assume that the display was erected 
by paid municipal employees, “there is no indication that the 
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portion of such expenditure attributable to the challenged 
elements of the display would have been more than the de 
minimis expenditure that was involved in the Bible reading in 
Doremus [in which the teacher or school principal was 
responsible for the readings].”  Id. at 264 (citing Doremus v. 
Bd. of Educ., 71 A.2d 732, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950); Doe v. 
Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 
1999) (en banc)).  Similarly, the ACLU-NJ Court refused to 
assume that the township expended more than a de minimis 
amount of money to light the display’s religious elements.  Id.  
After all, the display also featured an evergreen tree, 
decorated urns, and candy can banners.  Id. at 260.  However, 
the issuance of $52.5 million in municipal bonds cannot 
really be compared to the trivial amount of taxpayer money a 
municipality could have possibly spent in order to erect and 
light two discrete components of a seasonal holiday display.  
This appeal instead implicates millions of dollars in debt 
“backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing 
municipality” and payable “by tax revenue.”  In re Smurfit-
Stone Container Corp., 425 B.R. 735, 737 n.2 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2010) (citing Greenberg, Municipal Sources:  Some Basic 
Principles and Practices, 9 Urb. Law. 340-41 (1977)).  Such 
indebtedness clearly represents a measurable liability or 
encumbrance of the municipality.  Given the nature of the 
relationship between a municipality and municipal 
taxpayers—“which is not without some resemblance to that 
subsisting between stockholder and private corporation,” 
Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487 (citing 4 Dillon, Municipal 
Corporations § 1580 et seq (5th ed.))—this liability in turn 
constitutes a burden on the taxpayers themselves, see, e.g., 
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879) (“[I]t would 
seem eminently proper for courts of equity to interfere upon 
the application of the taxpayers of a county to prevent the 
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consummation of a wrong, when the officers of those 
corporations, assume, in excess of their powers, to create 
burdens upon property-holders.”). 
 
According to the majority, Nichols “has not challenged 
the expenditure of the $52.5 million, merely the special 
election that approved the issuance of the bonds.”  (Maj. Op. 
at 6.)  Purportedly, “[b]ecause the $52.5 million was not spent 
on an illegal practice, Nichols cannot assert municipal 
taxpayer standing to challenge the expenditure.”  (Id. at 13.)  I 
nevertheless believe that an expenditure of taxpayer money 
specifically “approved” by a special election conducted under 
unconstitutional voting rules constitutes “an illegal practice.”  
These two components—i.e., the expenditure and the election 
approving the expenditure—should not be severed in the 
manner suggested by the majority.  After all, the legality of 
the bond issuance itself depends on the special election and 
its outcome—which, in this case, was decided by thirty-one 
votes.  Could an expenditure really be considered anything 
other than “an illegal practice” where the requisite election 
approving the expenditure itself violated “the ‘one person, 
one vote’ principle of the 14th Amendment” as well as basic 
constitutional principles governing voter residency 
requirements?  (A12.) 
 
  Federal “municipal taxpayer” cases also indicate that 
Nichols satisfies the injury requirement with respect to the 
proposed bond issuance and the underlying special election.  
ACLU-NJ had already been fully litigated on the merits, and 
the plaintiffs accordingly had the burden of proving their 
standing “‘in the same way as any other matter on which the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 
degree of evidence required at successive stages of the 
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litigation.’” ACLU-NJ, 246 F.3d at 261 (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561).  This matter comes to us on a motion to dismiss.  
As the District Court acknowledged, we must accept as true 
all material allegations set forth in the complaint, and general 
factual allegations of injury may be sufficient at this early 
stage of the litigation.  See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.  In addition, I have already 
highlighted the generous nature of the municipal taxpayer 
standing doctrine.  In fact, a municipal taxpayer need not 
show there is a likelihood of any resulting savings that will 
inure to his or her benefit, see, e.g., City of N.Y., 972 F.2d at 
466, or “a net loss to the municipal fisc,” Smith, 641 F.3d at 
212 (citing, inter alia, ACLU-NJ, 246 F.3d at 262).  In 
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879), the Supreme 
Court concluded that county taxpayers had standing to 
challenge a bond issuance on the grounds that the issuance 
violated a state statute limiting the county’s total expenditures 
to the amount of money it raised by taxes, id. at 607-09.  We 
similarly should permit a taxpayer to challenge a bond 
issuance on the grounds that it is based on an election 
conducted in an unconstitutional manner. 
 
As Nichols points out, a number of state supreme 
courts have held that municipal taxpayers possessed the 
requisite standing to challenge the issuance of bonds on the 
grounds of underlying electoral illegalities.  Relying on the 
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Crampton, the 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that, “[w]henever a 
citizen and taxpayer is confronted with the proposition that an 
illegal election for the issuance of bonds has been held and 
the issuance of the bonds will result in the imposition of an 
illegal tax burden upon him, he has the right to proceed either 
in equity to enjoin the issuance of the bonds . . . or to proceed 
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by filing a petition in the pending matter.”  Appalachian Elec. 
Power Co. v. Town of Galax, 4 S.E.2d 390, 392 (Va. 1939).  
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a municipal 
taxpayer could contest the result of a special bond election—
and the official declaration of the election result—on the 
grounds that several identified persons were permitted to vote 
even though they were not qualified to do so (and that, 
without these votes, the proposition would not have passed).  
Henley v. Elmore Cty., 242 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Idaho 1952).  
More recently, Maine’s highest court allowed a taxpayer to 
challenge a municipality’s attempt to incur debt based on 
what the taxpayer believed was an unlawful recounting of 
previously rejected absentee ballots.  McCorkle v. Town of 
Falmouth, 529 A.2d 337, 337-39 (Me. 1987).  Even 
Defendants acknowledge that the McCorkle and Henley 
courts allowed the respective taxpayers to “challenge 
municipality’s vote count.”  (Appellees’ Brief at 16 n.9 
(citing Henley, 242 P.2d at 857; McCorkle, 529 A.2d at 
338).)  If a municipal taxpayer has standing to challenge the 
vote count, why wouldn’t he or she have the right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the basic rules the 
municipality used to decide who may vote—and how many 
votes they may cast?1  
                                              
 1 While we should approach state court case law 
applying standing principles with some caution, see, e.g., 
Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that “we should apply 
Pennsylvania case law respecting the broad rights of 
municipal taxpayers to sue local government agencies”), I 
find that these bond election opinions have special 
significance given the fact that neither the majority nor 
Defendants themselves cite to any contrary federal (or even 
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Likewise, Nichols’s pendent state law claim 
constitutes a good-faith pocketbook action.  The majority 
compares the expense of buying a single newspaper 
advertisement with the potential de minimis costs of erecting 
and lighting the religious elements of the seasonal holiday 
display at issue in ACLU-NJ.  However, the taxpayers’ 
Establishment Clause claim implicated the purported costs of 
erecting and lighting the crèche and menorah—as opposed to 
what the township may have spent to erect and light the 
display in its entirety.  In contrast, Nichols does not merely 
challenge some minor component of a municipal expenditure.  
She instead alleged that it was the purchase of the newspaper 
advertisement itself that violated Delaware state law.  
According to her amended complaint, “Rehoboth, utilizing 
taxpayer funds (on information and belief), caused to be 
published in a local newspaper a full-page advertisement 
exhorting people to ‘Vote Yes,’ i.e., in favor of the proposed 
outfall project, and presenting a one-sided view of the project, 
without affording opponents the opportunity by means of that 
financed medium to present their side.”  (A12-A13.)  “The 
expenditure is not within Rehoboth’s express or implied 
power and so is unlawful.”  (A13.)  While it may not have 
cost the municipality and its taxpayers that much money to 
purchase a single advertisement, “‘[m]unicipal taxpayer 
standing simply requires the “injury” of an allegedly 
                                                                                                     
state) case law that specifically consider whether a taxpayer 
has standing to challenge a bond issuance based on purported 
irregularities in the bond election.  This case law also appears 
to be consistent with the generous doctrine of taxpayer 
standing recognized by the United States Supreme Court.  See 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 4 S.E.2d at 392 (quoting 
Crampton, 101 U.S. at 609).    
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improper expenditure of municipal funds’” (Maj. Op. at 13 
n.2 (quoting Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 770 (9th 
Cir. 1991))).  See, e.g., D.C. Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 9 
(“Although the factual record on this allegation is sparse, we 
think appellees have made a sufficient showing to avoid 
dismissal for lack of standing.  The District spent $7,000 in 
the 1984 campaign [to influence the outcome of an initiative], 
which is evidence that it may do so again.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
“Injury is only the first part of the standing analysis; 
the plaintiff must also establish that the challenged action 
caused the injury and that the injury would be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”  Id. at 5 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 751 (1984)).  Defendants insist that, “[b]ecause the 
Delaware General Assembly adopted the voting requirements 
contained in the City’s Charter, the ‘causation’ prong is not 
satisfied because the challenged conduct is not caused by the 
City, rather it is ‘th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court’—the State.”  
(Appellees’ Brief at 21 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).)  
In fact, Defendants repeatedly attempt to shift the focus—and 
blame—from themselves to the State of Delaware.  
Nevertheless, it was Defendants’ choice to undertake a 
special election, to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional 
voting rules set forth in the City Charter, and to incur millions 
of dollars in municipal debt on the basis of what turned out to 
be a closely contested election.  “[G]overnment officials are 
not bound to follow state law when that law is itself 
unconstitutional.  Quite the contrary:  in such a case, they are 
bound not to follow state law.”  Carhart v. Steinberg, 192 
F.3d 1142, 1152 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 120 S. Ct. 2597 
(2000).  Nichols likewise seeks only prospective relief, and 
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the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to such 
claims.  See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 
244 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
More generally, I find that Plaintiffs satisfy both the 
causation and redressability elements.  As the majority notes, 
“municipal taxpayer standing simply requires the ‘injury’ of 
an allegedly improper expenditure of municipal funds.”  
Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1991).  In 
this case, the “injury” consists of a proposed multi-million 
dollar bond issuance—which was based on a special election 
decided by a mere thirty-one votes pursuant to voting rules 
that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  In turn, 
the federal judiciary could provide redress by, inter alia, 
enjoining Defendants from issuing any bonds if they fail to 
conduct an election that complies with the United States 
Constitution.2  With respect to the state law claim, Nichols 
specifically alleged an improper expenditure of funds—the 
purchase of a newspaper advertisement presenting a one-
sided view of the proposed project—which could be remedied 
by declaratory or injunctive relief.  See, e.g., D.C. Common 
Cause, 858 F.2d at 9 (“Appellees’ injury—the District’s 
                                              
2 While Defendants take issue with Nichols’s failure to 
raise her objections until after the special election took place, 
they do not cite to any case specifically holding that the 
respective plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to 
object before the election or took too long to file their lawsuit 
(and, in two of the decisions they cite, the courts actually 
determined that the plaintiffs possessed standing, see Fulani 
v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1990); Soules v. 
Kauaians for Nukoli Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 1179 
(9th Cir. 1988)).  
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future misuse of public funds [to influence the outcome of 
initiatives]—will be redressed by an injunction prohibiting 
such expenditures.”). 
 
 Having determined (unlike the majority) that Nichols 
possesses standing under Article III to pursue her 
constitutional and state law claims, I must also consider 
whether she satisfies the requirements for prudential standing.  
In Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1989), 
several city taxpayers and residents “asserted an equal 
protection violation resulting from the application of minority 
business enterprise participation requirements (‘MBE’) to a 
city construction project,” id. at 645.  We agreed with the 
district court that these plaintiffs—as municipal taxpayers—
had Article III standing.  Id. at 648.  However, “[t]he question 
is whether these appellants have sustained a proximate, 
individual, and addressable injury, based solely upon their 
status as municipal residents and taxpayers.”  Id.  Relying on 
our earlier ruling in Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 
1979), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Amato v. 
Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991), the Rocks Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfied these prudential 
requirements.  Rocks, 868 F.2d at 648.  Frissell, a 
Philadelphia taxpayer, sought to enjoin the mayor from 
denying customary public advertising to a newspaper in 
retaliation for unfavorable news articles, although the 
newspaper had not joined in the lawsuit or filed its own action 
against the city.  Id.  “Similarly, in this case no business 
enterprise or construction worker, those most likely to have 
suffered injury under the challenged bid specifications, has 
joined the complaint or brought suit to enjoin the city.  The 
appellants here are solely taxpayers, resting their claim on the 
legal rights and interests of third parties, to-wit, those 
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business entities and workers not qualifying under the MBE 
requirements.”  Id.; see also Warnock, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 546 
(“Rocks suggests that plaintiff is required to establish more 
than an injury received ‘solely’ on his status as a municipal 
taxpayer in order to overcome prudential standing 
limitations.”). 
 
In light of Rocks (and Frissell), I conclude that Nichols 
lacks prudential standing to bring Counts I and II challenging 
the imposition of a sixth-month residency requirement.  But I 
reach the opposite conclusion with respect to her state law 
cause of action (Count IV) as well as her claim (Count III) 
alleging that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
by allowing property owners to vote more than once in the 
special election.  On the one hand, Nichols satisfied the sixth-
month residency requirement and accordingly was allowed to 
vote in the special election—which she did.  No disqualified 
voter, “those most likely to have suffered injury under [this 
residency requirement],” has joined this litigation or filed 
their own actions against Defendants.  Rocks, 868 F.2d at 
648.  On the other hand, a rule granting multiple votes to 
property owners—as well as a bond issuance based on the 
outcome of a closely contested election conducted under such 
a voting rule—directly affected Nichols herself.  The 
purchase of an allegedly illegal newspaper advertisement 
similarly injured her.  She accordingly need not rest her claim 
on “the legal rights and interests of third parties.”  Id.  While 
new residents disqualified from voting in the election would 
appear to be the most appropriate parties to challenge the 
residency requirement, I question whether anyone else would 
be a more suitable plaintiff to litigate either the “one person, 
one vote” claim or the pendent state law cause of action.  
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 In conclusion, I would affirm the District Court’s order 
in part and vacate it in part.  The order would be affirmed 
insofar as it dismissed Counts I and II of the amended 
complaint.  Otherwise, I would vacate the order insofar as it 
dismissed Counts III and IV. 
